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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Discretion of Trustee in Expending Funds for Support
and Education of Minor Beneficiary
In Caswell v. Lenihan2 defendant was a trustee under a trust which pro-
vided that income from the trust was to be used by the defendant as he may
deem necessary, or advisable properly to provide for the care, support, edu-
cation, and comfort of the plaintiff; and that any excess income not used
for such purposes was to be accumulated until plaintiff reached 21 years of
age, at which time such accumulations were to be paid to plaintiff. The
trust further provided that the defendant trustee should be absolutely
protected as to expenditures for the care, support, etc., of the plaintiff
beneficiary.
During the minority of the plaintiff the entire income received by the
defendant was paid over by him to the plaintiff's mother, with whom plain-
tiff lived most of the time, although a divorce decree had awarded custody
of plaintiff to her father. Plaintiff's mother, during the period such moneys
were paid to her, was having a difficult time maintaining her home.
In an action for an accounting from the defendant, plaintiff claimed
that the payments made by defendant to plaintiff's mother were a diversion
of the trust income for the benefit of the mother, for which defendant
should be held to account to the plaintiff. The Court of Common Pleas of
Cuyahoga County entered judgment for the defendant. The court of ap-
peals reversed the judgment,3 and the case was taken to the Supreme Court
upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record. In holding that
such payments were proper, the Supreme Court stated that where, as in
the present case, a fiduciary is given the widest possible discretion as to
the expenditure of funds entrusted to him for the benefit of another, and
he expends such funds in good faith and in a manner related to the terms
of the trust, there is no diversion of those funds because other persons
may think that the funds could have been more wisely and judiciously
expended.
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Administration
Order of Probate Court Discharging Surety Prior to
Final Accounting May Be Set Aside
The case of In re Estate of Gray' recognized that a probate court has gen-
'163 Ohio St. 539, 127 N.E.2d 385 (1955).
2 163 Ohio St. 331, 126 N.E.2d 902 (1955).
' 120 N.E.2d 317 (Ohio App. 1954).
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eral legal and equitable power to vacate a judgment which it had no juris-
diction to make. In this case an administrator c.ta., d.b.n. was appointed
in 1943 after the death of the executor who had been appointed in
1928. The executor had filed no final account. When the administra-
tor learned of three items totalling $1,950 which the executor had not ac-
counted for, he obtained from the probate court an order authorizing him
to compromise this claim for $1,950 and discharging the executor's surety
company from further liability upon payment of this amount. Later the
administrator learned of two additional items totalling $4,726.10 and upon
petition to -the probate court had its prior order set aside. The surety
company protested in vain against the setting aside of the order which
discharged it from further liability. The Ohio Supreme Court held the
first order was improper because the representative of the deceased executor
had not filed a final account, and therefore the probate court had no juris-
diction to discharge the surety from further liability.
Filing Claim After Four Months Period
A creditor was informed by a person who had no connection with the
deceased's estate that decedent's widow had been appointed administratrix.
After the creditor filed its claim with decedents widow, the attorney for de-
cedent's administrator wrote the creditor that he was attorney for decedent's
estate. This letter did not disclose the name of -the administrator. The
petition of the creditor for authority to file its claim after the expiration of
four months from the appointment of the administrator was denied by the
probate court. The court of appeals in the case of In re Miller's Estate2
affirmed this denial because the creditor could have learned the name of
the administrator from the administrator's attorney or from the records of
the probate court. Therefore, the probate court properly exercised its dis-
cretion in denying the creditor's petition.
When the creditor had no knowledge, within the four month period,
of his debtor's death or of the appointment of a personal representative the
probate court in the case of In re Dulles Estate3 properly authorized the
filing of his claim after the expiration of this period.
Death of Mortgagee
The court of appeals in Eastwood v. Capel4 properly stated that upon a
mortgagee's death, his rights as owner of a defaulted mortgage pass to his
personal representative as personal property, but if not enforced during the
162 Ohio St. 384, 123 N.E.2d 408 (1954).
298 Ohio App. 445, 129 N.E.2d 838 (1954); Miller's Estate v. Sublee Transfer, 98
Ohio App. 445, 124 N.E.2d 450 (1954).
S130 N.E.2d 253 '(Ohio Prob. 1955).
'126 N.E.2d 343 (1955).
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administration of the estate, these rights pass to the mortgagee's heirs. Al-
though this issue was not before the court, because the right of the mort-
gagee's heirs to enforce the mortgage had not been put in issue, the court
desired to indicate its disapproval of the earlier case of Stafford v. Collts 5
which denied the mortgagee's heirs the right to enforce the mortgage after
administration of the mortgagee's estate had been completed.
Final Distribution by Transfer to Life Beneficiary
When a testator provides in his will that life beneficiaries are to be
given possession of property in which they have life interests, an order
of a court approving the transfer of the property to the life beneficiaries
without bond is an approval of final distribution. Thereafter the property
is no longer part of the testator's estate and is beyond the jurisdiction of the
probate court. The Ohio Supreme Court so held in In re Sextons Estate.6
Under section 2113.58 of the Ohio Revised Code the probate court has
broad powers to determine whether possession of personal property should
be given to life beneficiaries even when the will so provides.7
Description of Beneficiary
Gift to Named Charitable Organization,
"As Now Organized and Functioning"
Testator in 1949 executed his will in which he gave ten thousand dollars
"to the Christian Church of Chardon, Ohio, as now organized and func-
tioning." On July 7, 1950 this church and another church consolidated
to form The Pilgrim-Christian Church in accordance with section 1715.10
of the Ohio Revised Code. Under this section each of the consolidating
churches is to be regarded as continuing for the purpose of any gifts to them
in their respective names. The issue before the Ohio Supreme Court in the
case of In re Barker's Will8 was whether -the testator had indicated by the
language of his will that this statutory provision should not apply. The
court, in construing the testator's will, took into consideration the fact that
testator knew about section 1715.10, and held that by his inter vivos gifts to
The Pilgrim-Christian Church, and by his acts he dearly indicated that he
regarded this church as his church. Therefore, the court affirmed the de-
cision of the court of appeals awarding -the legacy to the Pilgrim-Christian
Church in accordance with section 1715.10.
516 Ohio L. Abs. 621 (1933).
e 163 Ohio St. 124, 126 N.E.2d 129 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 838 (1955).
'In re Estate of Miller, 160 Ohio St. 529, 117 N.E.2d 598 (1954).
'162 Ohio St. 531, 124 N.E.2d 421 (1955).
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Determination of Heirship
Not Equity Proceeding
The Ohio Supreme Court in Bradford v. Micklethwaite9 considered an
action under section 2123.01 of the Ohio Revised Code to determine heir-
ship as part of the administration of an estate and therefore an action at
law. The mere fact that this statutory action does not provide for a jury
does not make it equitable. Consequently, on appeal from the probate
court to the court of appeals, only questions of law may be considered.
Burden of Federal Estate Tax
Charitable and Non-Charitable Beneficiaries
On the authority of Campbell v. Lloyd'0 the Ohio Supreme Court in
Hall v. Ball" distributed the burden of the federal estate tax among all of
testator's residuary beneficiaries, including several charities. The dis-
tribution of the burden of this tax depends upon state law when the testa-
tor does not state how the burden is to be distributed. The state courts
usually try to distribute the burden the way they believe the testator would
have specified if his attention had been called to the problem. Although
in Hall t'. Ball the amount of the federal estate tax was increased when this
tax was distributed among all residuary benficiaries, including the charities,
this increase in the tax is not necessarily contrary to a testator's presumed
interest.
Interest on General Legacy
Direction to Invest in Government Bonds
Section 2113.25 of the Ohio Revised Code provides that the executor or
administrator shall complete the administration of the estate so far as he
is able within nine months after the date of his appointment. In the case
of In re Estate of Shanafelt'2 the Ohio Supreme Court required the execu-
tors to pay interest of two and one-half per cent per annum (beginning
nine months after the appointment of the executors) on a charitable be-
quest of twenty thousand dollars which testator had directed should be in-
vested in United States Government Bonds at all times. The fact that the
estate had been involved in extended litigation did not relieve the executors
of the obligation to invest the twenty thousands dollars in Government
'163 Ohio St. 301, 127 N.E.2d 21 (1955).
"162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954).
"162 Ohio St. 299, 123 N.E.2d 259 (1954).
'
2 164 Ohio St. 258, 129 N.E.2d 816 (1955).
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Bonds. The court fixed the interest rate at two and one-half per cent in-
stead of the usual six per cent because that was the rate paid on United
States Government Bonds on and after the time when the money should
have been invested in them.
Probate
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Not Applicable
Probate proceedings are in rem and are not an action as that word is
used in the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. Therefore, this act has
no application to the probating of a will according to the probate court in
Case v. Case.13 If an heir has his domicile in Ohio but is temporarily absent
from the state while in military service, his "usual place of residence" for
purpose of service under sections 2107.13 and 2101.26 of the Ohio Revised
Code is the place in Ohio which he left to enter military service and to
which he intends to return.14
Surviving Spouse
Power of Probate Court to Authorize Guardian of
Incompetent Surviving Spouse to Buy Mansion House
There is a definite trend in favor of increasing the rights of the surviv-
iug spouse against the estate of the deceased spouse. Statutes setting forth
the rights of the surviving spouse are construed liberally. In Dorfmeier v.
Dorfmi er'5 a probate court upon petition of the guardian of an incom-
petent widow, under its equity powers, authorized the guardian on behalf
of the widow to purchase the mansion house at its appraised value. The
probate court properly held that the nondivisible urban house occupied
by a husband and wife before the husband's death is a "mansion house"
as that phrase is used in section 2113.38 of the Ohio Revised Code, although
small portions of the house have been and are rented to others.
Vacating Widow's Election to Take Against Will
In Smith v. First National Bank1 6 the common pleas court, pursuant to a
suit in equity, vacated the election of a widow to take against the will of her
husband. Although the widow had been advised by her counsel to take
against the will, neither the widow nor her counsel knew at -the time of
election that she would receive eleven thousand dollars more if she took
'124 N.E.2d 856 (Ohio Prob. 1955).4Ibid.
s 123 N.E.2d 681 (Ohio Com. P1. 1954).
"124 N.E.2d 851 (Ohio Con. PL 1954).
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under her husband's will and not against it. It was this lack of full knowl-
edge of the facts and the fact that no innocent third persons were involved
that caused the court to vacate the election.
Widow Separated from Husband Prior to His Death
Entitled to Statutory Exemptions and Allowances
The court of appeals in the case of In re Clark's Estate-7 reluctantly held
that a widow who had voluntarily lived away from her husband for twenty-
two years was nevertheless entitled at his death to the widow's statutory
exemptions and allowances. This case raises the question whether the ap-
plicable statutes should be amended to bar from their benefits a surviv-
ing spouse who without cause has elected to live apart from the other
spouse for a certain period prior to his or her death."'
Right of Widow to Set Aside Inter Vivos Gifts by Husband
The benefits of the right of a widow to take against the will of her
husband are seriously impaired if this right may be substantially defeated
by inter vivos gifts from the husband to third persons. In the same way
a wtife may deprive her husband of his statutory rights to take against her
will. Various jurisdictions are now in the process of working out a satis-
factory solution to this probiem.19 The probate court in MacLean v. J. S.
MacLean Co.20 almost completely ignored this difficult problem by using as
its test whether the husband had failed to support his wife during their joint
lives to determine whether to set aside substantial gifts of stock by the hus-
band to his children by a former wife. These gifts were made -by the husband
to prevent his second wife from taking this stock after his death as his heir
or against his will. Yet, since the husband had supported his wife during
their joint lives, and since this duty of support terminated at the husband's
death, the court upheld the gifts to the children* against the claim of their
stepmother.
Right of Widow With Respect to Joint Bank Account
in Name of Husband and Third Person
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that when -the settlor of a trust re-
serves the income and the right to revoke or amend the trust, the sertlor's
widow at his death is entitled to a portion of the trust property if she elects
' 128 N.E.2d 437 (Ohio App. 1954).
sSIMES, MODEL PROBATE CODE 263 (1946). Compare OHIO REv. CODE §
2103.05 (spouse who leaves other spouse "and dwells in adultery" barred from
dower); 20 PA. PURDON'S STAT. § 180.9.
"ATKINsoN, WILLs S 32 (1953); Bensing, Inter Vivos Trusts and The Election
Rights of A Surviving Spouse, 42 KY. L J. 616 (1954).
21123 N.E.2d 761 (Ohio Prob. 1955).
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to take her statutory share.21 However, when a husband, a few months prior
to his death had his individual savings account changed to a joint bank
account with his sister so that at his death his sister would receive the
amount in the account, and to prevent his wife from claiming any portion
of this account, the court of appeals in Guitner v. McEwen12 held that the
wife as the surviving spouse had no claim to any portion of the joint bank
account. The explanation made by the court for its decision is not satis-
factory. If the purpose of the law is to protect the rights of the surviving
spouse, then it is immaterial that neither spouse is the creditor of the other.
Yet the court relied upon this fact. The court also treated the creation of the
joint bank account as an absolute transfer when, in fact, a joint bank account
is similar to a revocable trust.
A logical and simple way for Ohio to protect the right of a surviving
spouse to elect would be the enactment of a statute similar to section 33
of the Model Probate Code. This section reads as follows:
§33. Gifts in fraud of marital rights.
(a) Election to treat as devise. Any gift made by a person, whether
dying testate or intestate, in fraud of the marital rights of his surviving
spouse to share in his estate, shall, at the election of the surviving spouse,
be treated as a testamentary disposition and may be recovered from the
donee and persons taking from him without adequate consideration and
applied to the payment of the spouse's share, as in case of his election to
take against the will.
(b) When gift deemed fraudulent. Any gift made by a married per-
son within two years of the time of his death is deemed to be in fraud of
the marital rights of his surviving spouse, unless shown to the contrary.'
Delay in the adoption of a statutory provision of this type in Ohio will
probably result in prolonged and expensive litigation in the courts and in
decisions which may not be acceptable to the married residents of Ohio,
particularly the wives who are increasingly inclined to favor the basic con-
cepts of community property law.
Widow May Be Permitted to Elect After Expiration
of Nine Months from Probate
The Ohio Revised Code2 4 provides in part as follows:
After the probate of a will and filing of the inventory, appraisement,
and schedule of debts, the probate court ... shall issue a citation to the
surviving spouse to elect... The election shall be made within one month
'Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944); Harris v.
Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 (1947).
n99 Ohio App. 32, 124 N.E.2d 744 (1954).
SIMES, MODEL PROBATE CODE 72 (1946).
2'§ 2107.39.
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after service of the citation to elect, or if no citation is issued such election
shall be made within nine months after the appointment of the executor or
administrator. On a motion filed before the expiration of such nine months
and for good cause shown, the court may allow further time for the mak-
ing of the election....
This statute was enacted for the benefit of the surviving spouse. It should
be construed and administered to attain this desirable objective. If the
estate has not been administered, the inventory has not been filed, the
surviving spouse has not been cited to elect, and no person would be
prejudiced by a delayed election to take against the will, then the probate
court should permit election although the normal period of nine months
after probate for election has expired and no request for further time was
made within the nine month period. Under similar facts the court of
appeals properly reversed the judgment of the probate court in the case
of In re Estate of Bersin.25 The probate court had ruled that the surviv-
ing spouse could not elect after the nine months period to take against
the will even though no inventory and appraisement had been filed within
that period.
The court of appeals restricted to situations involving third persons
the applicability of section 2107A1 of the Ohio Revised Code which pro-
vides that the surviving spouse is conclusively presumed to have elected
to take under the will if there is no election to take against the will within
the period of nine months after probate. This decision is significant be-
cause it establishes the necessity of filing the inventory and appraisement
so that the surviving spouse may make an intelligent election to take under
the will or to take against the will.
Will Contest
Heirs Named as Defendants But Not Served and Other Heirs
Joined as Plaintiffs in Will Contest
The Ohio Supreme Court in Gravier v. Gluth, 6 decided an interesting
problem involving the jurisdiction of the common pleas court to hear a
will contest. Will contests must be brought within six months after a will
has been probated except where the persons involved are under a legal
disability27 All devisees, legatees, heirs, and other interested persons, in-
cluding the executor or administrator must be made parties.28
Testator's will was probated September 8, 1950. Three heirs brought
an action on February 27, 1951 to contest the will. Although the petition
m98 Ohio App. 468, 129 N.E.2d 868 (1955).
163 Ohio St. 232, 126 N.E.2d 332 (1955).
'
T OHIO REv. CODE § 2107.23.
2OmIO Rnv. CODE § 2741.02.
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named as defendants the sole legatee and devisee, the executrix, and three
named heirs, only the sole legatee and devisee and the executrix were served
with summons within the six months period after probate. On January 15,
1953, the contestants attempted to solve the jurisdictional problem by hav-
ing the three heirs who had been named originally as defendants and also
nine other heirs join as plaintiffs in the will contest. The common pleas
court ruled that the will contest had not been properly instituted within the
six month period after probate and that it did not have jurisdiction. The
Ohio Supreme Court affirmed this ruling for the simple reason that a con-
trary decision would extend indefinitely the time for settling estates, con-
trary to the established policy of the state. The Supreme Court considers
reasonable the statutory requirement that the heirs, as well as the personal
representative and beneficiaries under the will, must be made parties be-
cause of the statutory provision for joining unknown heirs. Some persons
may disagree with the reasonableness of this jurisdictional requirement.
Revocation of Wills
Testator's Wfill Not Revoked by His Marriage
A model probate code should provide specifically when a will is re-
voked by operation of law. Section 2107.33 of the Ohio Revised Code pro-
vides that "This section does not prevent the revocation implied by law,
from subsequent changes in the circumstances of the testator." Section
2107.37 provides that "A will executed by an unmarried woman is not re-
voked by her subsequent marriage." If a married woman executed a will,
before the death of her husband, is her will revoked by remarriage? If a
man executes a will and then marries, is his will revoked under section
2107.33? The court of appeals held in the case of In re Estate of Bersin;29
that marriage of a man does not revoke his will, citing an 1897 Ohio Cir-
cuit Court decision.3° The court of appeals did not mention section 2107.33
or section 2107.37. The specific changes in circumstances which will re-
voke a will by operation of law should be set forth in clear language in the
Ohio Revised Code.
Joint Bank Accounts
Simultaneous Death of Depositors
A joint bank account in Ohio is created by a contract between the bank
and one or both of the owners. This contract ordinarily provides that
2 98 Ohio App. 432, 129 N.E.2d 868 (1955).
'Mundy's Executors v. Mundy, 15 Ohio C.C. 155 (1897).
rune
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1955
either owner may make withdrawals, and, at the death of one, the survivor
is entitled to the entire balance.
The case of In re Markiewicz Estate31 arose -because the contracts of
joint deposit failed to provide for distribution of the balance in the joint
bank accounts when both depositors died simultaneously. The joint de-
positors were husband and wife who had engaged in business enterprises
together, although at times the wife received no wages or salary for her
services. The court therefore properly held that the balance in the joint
bank accounts should be divided equally between the estates of the joint
depositors.
The ordinary contract which creates the joint bank account fails to state
specifically the interest of each depositor in the account prior to the death
of one of the depositors. Consequently, creditors of either joint depositor
are at a disadvantage when they seek to reach their debtor's interest in a
joint bank account. Also, if the joint depositors die simultaneously, their
respective personal representatives may have difficulty determining the
share of each decedent in the balance in the joint bank account at the time
of the depositors' deaths. Both of these matters should be included in each
contract which establishes a joint bank account. However, banks are not
likely to take the .initiative in this matter, and joint bank -accounts are suf-
ficiently related to the disposition of property at death that a statute would
be proper. The statute might provide that whenever two or more persons
create a joint bank account with or without the provision that the sur-
vivor is entitled to the balance in the account, the rights of the depositors
are as follows: In the absence of any provision to the contrary in the con-
tract of joint deposit, (1) each is the owner of an equal interest which
can be reached by his creditors, (2) upon the simultaneous death of the
joint depositors, the balance in the joint bank account at that time is to
be-divided among their respective personal representatives, and (3) during
their joint lives as among themselves, but not with respect to the bank, each
may withdraw without the consent of the other his share of the amount in
the joint bank account. With respect to the bank, any joint depositor may
withdraw any amount from the joint bank account.
The possible use of a joint bank account between one spouse and a
third person to prevent the other spouse from taking any of the money in
the joint bank account at the death of the spouse who made the deposit is
considered above under the heading Surviving Spouse.
ROBERT N. CooK
3129 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio Prob. 1955).
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